We examine the relationship between privatization and growth of transition countries in Europe by using relative income and grouping them by ex-ante factors and by ex-post associations.
experiments as the best means of drawing the causal relationships for all three.
As noted by Djankov and Murrell (2002) , privatization of ownership and liberalization of markets in ex-socialist countries provide an excellent natural experiment to economists in view of their fast and all-encompassing introduction. Different theoretical models predict a positive relationship of privatization/liberalization with growth. In general equilibrium framework, Gylfason (1998) employing a two-sector full employment model and Hansen (1997) with an imperfect competition model, predict that privatization and market (instead of administered) prices either act like removing a price distortion through price reform/trade liberalization or enhances micro-economic efficiency through a broad distribution of ownership rights. These conclusions are supported by empirical studies by Berkowitz and DeJong (2003) for post-Soviet Russia; but not by Bennett et al. (2007) They find large short-term effects of structural policy on growth using a panel with fixed effects; or, alternatively, using "independence," (how politically free a country was in 1988) as instrument for economic institutions.
European economies in transition also provide setting for a second natural experiment. On May 1, 2004, the following transition economies joined the European Union: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. They were soon followed by Bulgaria and Romania (on January 1, 2007) . Upon joining, they were required to follow EU standards, norms, regulations, and practices. Such a large number of countries adopting EU norms 2 They find more than half of the CIS countries were not politically free, and had decreasing political rights over this period.
at the same time also provides a natural setting to answer whether or not adopting EU norms and standards enhances growth or worsens it.
As far as I can tell, none of the studies cited above have examined growth effects of either EU accession or of privatization/regime change from a command to a market economy by grouping countries by either ex-ante factors or by ex-post associations. Longer-term (i.e., pre-1991) comparable data, that is available for ex-socialist countries that that have been separate countries since the Second World War (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Romania), is eminently suitable for conducting a natural experiment for comparative study of growth effects of the two regimes: Command vs. Market. The other ex-socialist countries that emerged or re-emerged as independent new countries in 1991/1993, (and for which comparable pre1991 data is unavailable in any comprehensive way) can also be grouped by whether they had civil war as they became independent and separate countries or whether post-transition they formed into CIS or whether they aspired to join, and then joined, the EU instead. This permits us to conduct the second natural experiment: Whether adopting EU norms and standards has any effect on growth.
We use the longest comparable data that is available for transition economies to examine the open questions of the mechanism of privatization leading to economic success, if any; and their lessons for long term growth for developing countries.
3 See, Estrin et al. (2009 
For each subsequent year, similar ratios of a country's annual per-capita RGDP to that of the bench mark country are computed. The catch-up index for Country J for year t is the ratio of its per capita RGDP ratio for year t to its base per capita RGDP ratio. Let IJt represent this index. Then,
IJt is the index of income ratios. By converting all income ratios to the same base, the catch-up index helps us identify the breaks/turning points, and compare/combine different countries' experience. It is depicted for the four countries with respect to Germany for all available years in Figure 2 . 5 Its increase shows relative convergence (that is not sufficient for absolute convergence, i.e., for income gap to decrease), while its decrease shows both relative and absolute divergence (since, relative divergence is sufficient for absolute divergence). All BHPR countries exhibit both catching-up (relative convergence, RC) and falling back (relative divergence, RD). (1985-2006), and 25 years (1988-2013) , respectively. Similarly, Poland shows no catching-up for 24 years and Hungary for 20 years EBRD's TIs) raises annual growth by 2.7%. We find the whole-scale adoption of privatization and structural change from command to market economy by BHPR countries increased growth rate by only 0.5 points. 7 We prefer geometric mean (GM) as the average -like median, (and unlike arithmetic mean) it is not affected much by extreme values (e.g., GM of 8, 27, and 125 is 30); unlike median, it incorporates the values of all observations in it. Further, appendix Table 1 gives their performance over the longest period for which we have comparable and reliable data. Table 3 gives their catch-up to the EU accession year.
Surprisingly, for 14 years of privatization/shift to a market economy, their economic performance was the same as during the command economy. That is, all the post-transition better economic performance came only after they joined EU. Privatization/mere shift to the market economy was not sufficient to boost growth; it required adopting EU norms and standards also.
Based on Solow (1957) , comparative standards of living have been explained either in levels or in their growth. The former decomposes cross-section differences in output per worker levels into differences in physical capital-labor ratios, quality of human capital, and productivity.
See, Caselli (2005) (2013) and PWT 9.0. We prefer the nomenclature "human capital measure" or "average human capital" since the values are not expressed as a ratio to a base year's values.
Then, Country J's income ratio to the US is,
(4) tells us Country J's income ratio depends on ratios of the two TFPs, the two capitallabor ratios and the two average human capital. As noted above, Peron and Rey (2012) We estimate (4) (rather than use the catch-up index on the left hand-side and express the right hand-side ratios as indices too). We also do not take three-year moving-average values thereby obtaining data for 1960/1970 and 2014 as well. The estimable version of (4) is:
We undertake panel estimation of (5); separately for 1960/1970 to 1991, 1991 to 2014, 1991 to EU accession, and EU accession to 2014. These data are available in PWT 9.0 for these periods for BHPR countries. We take annual data rather than that averaged over five or ten nonoverlapping years since the latter throws away too much information. See, Attanasio et al. (2000) .
In panel estimation, following Kennedy (2008) , we first test the null that the intercepts are equal.
If this null is accepted, pooled OLS estimation is used. If it is rejected, we apply the Hausman test to test if the random effects model is unbiased. If this null is not rejected, we used the random effects model; if this null is rejected, we use the fixed effects model. Comparing the two sub-periods of the post-transition period, human capital is not significant in the first, and physical capital is significant at 10% level in the second. All other coefficients are significant at 1% level. Although the contribution of TFP declines, the said decline is more than made up by human capital in the post EU accession period -its contribution is almost four times what it was in the socialist and the 1991 to EU-accession periods (although the latter effect is not statistically significant). Human capital entirely explains the higher catchingup by BHPR countries in both the post-socialist and the post-EU-accession periods.
"New" ex-socialist countries
This section analyzes the catching-up experience and growth factors for ex-socialist entities that came into being or re-emerged as separate independent countries in 1991/1993 by i) the breakup of the former U.S.S.R. into its constituent republics, ii) the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, and iii) the splitting of Czechoslovakia into its two parts; limiting ourselves to countries for which data on explanatory variables are available. We divide these countries into three groups based on the following ex ante and ex post factors: whether they aspired to EU membership and joined it in 2000s, whether their separation accompanied internecine war for many years, and whether formed into CIS. The first group consists of Slovenia, the Baltic countries, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, called hereinafter as SBCS countries, who joined EU in the middle of 2004 (and were under the Soviet system for about five decades); the second of ex-Yugoslavia countries Croatia and Serbia, (and were under the Soviet system for about four decades); and the third group of exSoviet Union countries, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Ukraine, (and were under the Soviet system for about seven decades).
9 Table 3A presents catching-up results for "new" ex-socialist countries in three panels:
Panel I for SBCS countries; Panel II for Croatia and Serbia; and Panel III for CIS countries, The
"new" ex-socialist countries have experienced significantly worse economic performance than "old" ex-socialist (BHPR) countries over the same period. The three groups of "new" ex-Socialist countries have caught-up/fallen-behind Germany (that grew at 2.5%) at 0.61%, 0.58%, and -2.19 % rate, respectively -versus 1.50 % catching-up for the "old" socialist countries. Megginson (2005) found that mass privatization did not yield the expected positive results. We find the results varied greatly among the four groups of ex-socialist countries with them arranged in the following descending order: "old" ex-socialist (BHPR), SBCS, Croatia and Serbia, and CIS -even though all four groups had almost the same trajectory of privatization and transition to a market economy.
See, Figure 3 .
We also find that, in contrast to Svejnar (2002) Figure 4 shows the dynamics of the average (GM) catch-up index for the four groups of ex-socialist countries for the 1991-2013 period. Roland (2000) finds no transition country avoided a serious and major output fall at the beginning of transition. We find the BHPR countries hardly show any falling-behind (Germany's growth). SBCS and Croatia and Serbia groups more than fully recover after an initial falling-behind. CIS countries fall-behind sharply for about ten years and their relative income was about 40% lower in 2013 than what it was in 1991. Roland (2000) explains the initial fall to credit crunch, snapping of network externalities and freedom to engage in monopoly behavior by enterprises. Yet, he does not explain why these factors had no effect on BHPR countries and such strong effect in CIS countries (that their income gap from Germany is so much higher in 2013 than it was in 1991 -since relative divergence is sufficient for absolute divergence). than the aggregate TI (shown in Figure 3 ). Yet, in contrast to the conclusions of Nannicini and
Billmeier (2010) (that making the transition without opening up to trade considerably hampers growth) almost equal focus on external liberalization/opening up to trade did not benefit the four groups of countries equally whether in the short or the long-run.
On the other hand, Berkowitz and DeJong (2003) explain the enormous regional differences in economic growth rates in post-Soviet Russia by regional differences in price liberalization policies and large-scale privatization. only BHPR countries show a slightly better post-socialist economic performance (at about onehalf point higher). Post-socialist SBCS countries and Croatia and Serbia catch-up to Germany at a lower rate, and CIS countries fall behind Germany, both relatively and absolutely.
Further, catching-up of SBCS countries happened only after they joined EU. Panel B of Table 3 shows these countries' incomes fell behind Germany's income for 13 years (1991 to 2004) since their launch of privatization and market economy. The shift to privatization and market economy increased income gaps of both SBCS and CIS countries from Germany. But, SBCS countries were able to stop their declining living standards vis a vis Germany after they joined EU.
Both the i) higher catching-up of BHPR countries after privatization in 1991 (as compared to the period before that) and ii) all positive catching-up of SBCS countries since 1991, are entirely explained by the spurt in catching-up after they joined EU.
Now we study what changed in BHPR and SBCS countries in the few years before and after they joined EU. Bulgaria's accession was delayed because EU had especial concern about vast amount of corruption in high positions. The EU demanded Bulgaria needed to reestablish its legal codes; especially the system for prosecuting and investigating criminal networks, and enforcing laws surrounding money laundering and fraud. (Phinnemore, 2006) . In January 2006, the Bulgarian legislature adopted reforms generated by the public-private initiative, Coalition 2000, in the areas of "political level corruption, VAT fraud, a stricter system of implementation monitoring and a stronger mandate for the oversight government commission and in limiting or lifting the immunity of members of parliament and magistrates under specified conditions." (Pond, 2006 and Jesień, 2007) . Romania had to increase legal force to deal with its corruption, consolidate judicial and police reform and tackle issues on human rights, freedom of the press, and minority protection before being allowed into the EU. (Phinnemore, 2006 and Lusman, 2014) .
Like it did with Hungary, the EU persuaded Slovenia to bring its food processing and animal slaughter houses to EU's sanitary codes or animal health guidelines and its urban waste water treatment and collection systems to EU standards. (Potočnik, et al. 2007 ). Estonia had to agree to rely on other sources of power than the shale oil they had been using (environmental reform), satisfy EU of its hunting regulations, and revise many parts of its tax law, including its entire set of corporate income tax laws. (Streimann, 2007) . Latvia agreed to limit licensing requirements to a narrower scale of business activities, to raise the savings guarantees in the national banks as well as to introduce an Investment Compensation System by 2008, and to restructure each one of its milk, meat, and fish processing facilities. (Kesteris and Plamse, 2007) .
Lithuania consented to the shutting down of its two nuclear reactors, the first by 2005, and the second, by 2010, and to a closer enforcement of its borders with the Russian state of Kaliningrad. (Auštrevičius, 2007) On the other hand, the Czech Republic agreed to adequately staff its state aid systems and closure of the majority of its banks by the European Commission that the EC had deemed corrupt.
These banks were rebuilt using foreign involvement. (Telicka and Bartak, 2007) . Slovakia had to change its whole political structure in 1999 -with its first-ever presidential elections in May 1999
-to even be considered by the EU as a candidate for negotiations. They also had to adopt new laws into their constitution to align it with the needs of the European Commission and the Council of Europe and to increase transparency of governmental decisions. It had to restructure its entire banking structure, and to tighten tax-discipline of its business sector. (Figel' and Adamiš, 2007) .
Clearly, privatization, rapidly adopted in the early 1990s, was not sufficient for growth. It also needed legal, judicial and police reforms, restructuring of banking, adopting EU standards and practices in every detail, and increased transparency and control of political level corruption. Berkowitz, et al. (2014) find privatizing state-owned banks in Russia did not have any impact on economic growth if the banks still retained political connections. We find a stronger result: mass privatization across all industries in ten countries (BHPR and SBCS) did not boost growth if any of the problems listed in the previous paragraph were present. Croatia and Serbia and CIS panels are strongly balanced; with 25 observations for each country.
Croatia and Serbia panel is estimated by pooled OLS since it does not reject Breusch-Pagan
Lagrange multiplier test of equal intercepts; as before, the pooled OLS estimates are equal to the corresponding random-effect estimates. The CIS countries panels reject Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test of equal intercepts as well as the Hausman test of unbiased random effects. It is estimated by the fixed effects model. Two panels for SBCS countries are used: one for the period from 1990 to EU accession, and the other from EU accession to 2014. The contribution of physical capital to growth is much smaller in the second period, and its level of significance drops from 1% to 10%. On the other hand, human capital, that was not significant in the first period and had the negative sign, becomes significant at 1% level in the second period and has a strong positive effect.
The only reason that explains catching-up of SBCS countries after they joined EU (as compared to the period before it) is human capital; the only reason that explains falling behind of the CIS countries is the negative contribution of human capital. On the other hand, only physical capital and TFP explain the catching-up of Crotia and Serbia since the coefficient on human capital is negative. TFP's contribution to catching-up is more than double in SBCS countries for the post-EU period than it is in of Crotia and Serbia.
The above results may be contrasted to those by Dombi (2013 Table 6 reports results from panel estimation of growth factors of pre-2004 EU countries.
For ease of comparison, it also reproduces the results for growth factors for BHPR and SBCS countries since their accession to EU. For all three groups of countries, TFP is not the most important factor; human capital is. The negative contribution of capital-intensity for pre-2004 EU countries is surprising. The capital measure is physical (tangible) capital. It is possible this measure understates total capital: Some capital may be intangible capital that is mistakenly included in human capital.
We also calculate and report in Tables 1 and 3 the time it will it take for ex-socialist countries to reach income equality with Germany, following Kant (2018) . Based on the past catching-up for the longest period for which we have reliable and comparable data, Appendix Table 1 and Tables 1 and 3 project BHPR countries will reach income equality with Germany in 12 Western Europia's income fell behind Germany's at the annual rate of 0.20% (0.23% excluding Ireland) during this period.
107 years (but 72 years if the 1991-2013 catch-up rate is used); SBCS countries in 104 years, Croatia and Serbia in 193 years, and CIS countries have no prospect for ever reaching income equality with Germany. These results are to be taken with caution since the time for income quality with the benchmark country depends both on the period used for projecting into the future and the benchmark country considered. 13 Although Kant (2018) finds that of the 28 countries in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa that caught-up to the US from 1992 to 2013, 21 fell behind over a longer period; and the longer period catching-up rate of most of them are one-fifth to about onehalf of the 1992-2013 rate; the European ex-socialist countries longer period performance could be better. On the other hand, Table 5 shows pre-2004 EU countries as a group may reach income equality with Germany in 70 years (529 years excluding Ireland); and Finland, Portugal, and Spain in 70, 133, and 101 years, respectively. But, if these countries are considered one country, Western
Europia, extending its 1991-2013 falling behind to the future means it has no prospect of ever reaching income equality with Germany.
Conclusions
We use two natural experiments to examine the growth effects of i) privatization/regime 13 Comparing Appendix Table 1 to Table 1 , BHPR countries' longer term catching-up is slower -over 1961/1971 to 2013, it is at 1.19% rate versus the 1.50% rate for 1991-2013; and for two out of four countries the longer period catching-up rate is about one-third to two-thirds of the 1991-2013 rate. Further, all experienced no catching-up for periods ranging from 20 to 25 years.
This happened even though all these countries are upper middle income (two) or high income (two) as compared to South Asian and Sub-Saharan African countries where virtually all are lower income or lower middle income.
change from command to market economy and ii) joining EU using the ex-socialist countries in Europe. As far as I can tell, none of the empirical studies of this question have used data for both the post-1990 to the pre-1991 periods. We use the comparable pre-1991 data also; as well as using the longest post-1990 data that are available, and use the catch-up index and income ratio in our analysis. We group these countries into four: a) countries that have existed as separate countries since at least the Second World War, called BHPR (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Romania), or than it was in 1991 and they caught up only after joining EU; while CIS countries fell-behind so sharply that they still are at about 60% of the relative income to Germany level they had in 1991.
Privatization and shift to a market economy itself widened the income gap of most of these countries from Germany, but countries that joined EU were able to stop the relative divergence from the year of accession.
14 In contrast to Estrin et al. (2009) , we find TFP's contribution to output for BHPR countries was almost the same in the post-transition and pre-transition periods. Considering only the posttransition period, the "new" ex-socialist countries have done worse than "old" ex-socialist countries and reforms did not impose any short run costs on BHPR countries. All four groups of ex-socialist countries had almost the same trajectory of privatization and overall transition to a market economy. Contrary to Nannicini and Billmeier (2010) and Berkowitz and DeJong (2003) , We also examine within group convergence and years for full convergence to Germany.
Dispersion of absolute incomes has decreased in i) BHPR, ii) SBCS, and iii) Croatia and Serbia, has almost doubled in CIS countries; and has trebled for all these countries as a group from 1991-2013. Based on catching-up/falling-behind based on the 1991-2013 performance, CIS countries 14 As a point of comparison, we note that more than half of the "old" EU countries also We now note some of the implications of this paper and suggestions for further research.
The weaker growth effects of transition in "new" ex-socialist countries might be due to the burden of governance as a sovereign country for the first time and undertaking regime change while Third, political integration does not mean economic integration. Nitsch and Wolf (2009) find that although administrative barriers to trade between East and West Germany were rapidly eliminated with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the intra-German trade pattern has persisted along the former East-West border. The persistence of old trade patterns and economic relationships among CIS countries is likely to be even greater.
Lastly, even though its growth effects may be mixed, as noted by Shleifer and Vishny (1994) Notes: BHPR stands for Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. Data from which the above result are derived is from PWT 9.0. See, Kant (2018) for the equation to derive years for full convergence.
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